There is still too much administrative monopoly behavior in China's airline industry. By developing a standard economic model, this paper uses the data of China's airline industry to estimate the net loss of social welfare, the increase of total cost and the transfer effect of welfare. These studies will help us to understand the harm of administrative monopoly to China's airline industry so that measures will be taken to promote the reform of administrative monopoly.
Introduction
Usually, air transport industry is considered a natural monopoly industry, but actually it is an integrated industrial chain with a series of vertical business units. These businesses units formed a series of corresponding sub industries.It is generally agreed that airline sub industry which provides passenger and freight transportation services shows a characteristics of weak natural monopoly even a considerable degree of competition. However, there is still too much administrative monopoly behavior in China's airline industry.Sometimes natural monopoly may be a good thing, while administrative monopoly is almost a bad thing.This paper will further study the effects on China's airline industry caused by administrative monopoly.
The model

The net loss of social welfare
In Fig. 1 , neither the producer nor the consumers or government can get the part of social welfare which is represented by ABC ∆ .The area of ABC ∆ is also known as the net loss of social welfare caused by monopoly ( DWL ), which is often called "harberger triangle" (A.C.Harberger 1 ) by economists. It can be calculated as follows: Where, r is the potential profit rate of sales; m m Q P is sales revenue, which can be reached directly; η is the price elasticity of demand. 
2.2The increase of total cost
According to Fig. 1 , the increased total cost caused by the administrative monopoly (represented by C z ) is consisted of three rectangles, i.e. rectangleⅡ, Ⅲ, andⅣ.□ c m P BCP measures the monopoly profits in theory. However, in order to maintain its monopoly position, monopolies may spend profits that equals to the area of rectangle Ⅲon rent-seeking activities; At the same time, low internal productivity such as X-inefficiency will cost their profits that equals to the area of rectangleⅣ;High salary and employee benefits led to the unnecessary increase of labour cost which equals to the area of rectangleⅡ.The remaining area of rectangleⅠforms the actual profits of the administrative monopoly industry (there may be a loss).The increased total cost caused by administrative monopoly can be calculated as:
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Where, s r is the real profit rate
Combine with Eq. (5)
2.3The transfer of welfare
Because of the X-inefficiency, rent-seeking cost and so on, the excess profits of the administrative monopoly industry will come to a loss of rectangleⅢ and Ⅳ (see Fig.  1 ). The value represented by rectangle Ⅰand Ⅱis not lost, but they have different meaning for the monopoly industry. RectangularⅠis the actual excess profits which form the accounting profits of monopoly industry; RectangleⅡis an unnecessary increase in labor costs which is caused by voluntary increase in wages& benefits of workers of the administrative monopoly industry. In fact, it is the transfer of welfare from the producer to the industry practitioners. From the perspective of society as a whole, this part of increased cost is not wasted but transferred to workers in the form of wage & benefits. So rectangleⅡcan be deducted in the calculation of the total efficiency loss, and here it is calculated only to explain the welfare transfer of administrative monopoly.
Data and estimates
The net loss of social welfare caused by administrative monopoly
Determination of potential profit rate(r)
The key problem here is that the acquisition of potential profit rate is very difficult.
Because the U.S. air transport market is a very mature and highly competitive, price level of U.S. air transport may be approximately used as competitive price P c . It is very natural to think of the U.S. air transport price level to be converted into RMB using the purchasing power parity rate. Take China's air transport price level as P m, the potential profit rate thus can be carried out by Eq. (6). Purchasing power parity conversion factor (PPPCF, RMB/USD) published by the World Bank will be quoted directly in this paper. Due to the lack of data, U.S. air 
3.1.2Price elasticity of demand of china's airline industry (η )
L. Chen 4 calculated the price elasticity of China's airline industry and found that η has maintained at a relatively stable level in the last 10 years. In order to avoid repeated work, the result will be quoted in this paper at an average amount of 1.32837. Thus, the net loss of social welfare (NLSW, in billion Yuan) caused by administrative monopoly in China's airline industry can be calculated by Eq. (4). It is fluctuating between 13.85-43.02 billion Yuan during the period of 2005-2014, see Table 1 . Here, the total revenue of airline industry m m Q P TRAI = (in billion Yuan).
3.2The increase of total costcaused by administrative monopoly in airline industry
The potential profit rate has been estimated above, and the actual profit rate can be obtained by the actual profit (in billion Yuan) and the total revenue of the airline industry. According to Eq. (7), the actual profit rate can be calculated as:
The increased total cost (Cz) caused by administrative monopoly in airline industry is calculated by Eq. (8) as in Table 1 . It is fluctuating between 58.27-145.72 billion Yuan during the period of 2005-2014, which shows a great harm of administrative monopoly.
The transfer of welfare caused by administrative monopoly in airline industry
High welfare is usually implicit so that it is difficult to get the data.However the unnecessary increase in labor costs can be reflected in high wages. The unnecessary increase in labor costs can be estimated by comparing the average wage in airline industry with the average wage in all industries. In this case, the normal wage gap between the industries must be taken into consideration. It may be related to the technical requirements, work intensity of industry and so on. That is, high wage doesn't necessarily mean that there is administrative monopoly in the industry. There is little administrative monopoly in US airline industry.Define the ratio between average wage in U.S. airline industry and average wage in all other industries in U.S. as f, then f can be regarded as the normallevel of wage gap in china without administrative monopoly. Define f' is the same ratio in China. If f' > f, the difference between f' and f can be regarded as the extra welfare transferred to the employees. See Table2, where the average wage in airline industry is replaced by the average wage in air transport industry. AWAIC is the average wage in all industries in China (Yuan), AWATIC is the average wage in air transport industry in China (Yuan) , AE is airline employees in China （million） ,TW is the transfer of welfare(billion Yuan), TW' is transfer of welfare when considering hidden benefits (billion Yuan).According to the data released by the U.S. Department of labor in May 2011, the average wage in air transport industry in U.S. was $55790, and the average wage in all industries in U.S. over the same period was $45230. That means f =55790/45230=1.233. This ratio is relatively stable in each year both in U.S. and in China. In this case, f'= AWATIC/AWAIC. So TW can be reached by:
It seems that TW has increased from 4.10 billion Yuan in 2005 to 23.43 billion Yuan in 2014.However, if hidden benefits is considered, the ratio f' may be much higher. Let f'=4, then the transfer of welfare TW' can be achieved, which is much higher than TW. 
